Agency Problems and Financial Contracting (Prentice-Hall Foundations of Finance Series) (Self-Management Psychology Series)
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Agency Problems and Financial Contracting (Prentice-Hall Foundations of Finance Series) (Self-Management Psychology Series) by Amir Barnea

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Published by Prentice Hall College Div .
Written in English

Subjects:

  • Finance,
  • Business / Economics / Finance,
  • Corporations,
  • Corporate Finance,
  • Budgeting & financial management,
  • Agency (Law)

Book details:

The Physical Object
FormatPaperback
Number of Pages164
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL9284936M
ISBN 100130188476
ISBN 109780130188472

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Genre/Form: Educational tools (form) Additional Physical Format: Online version: Barnea, Amir. Agency problems and financial contracting. Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Incentive (Agency) Problems The most famous incentive paper in the corporate finance literature is Jensen and Meckling (). Jensen and Meckling argue that the value of the firm or project V is not fixed, as MM assume: rather it depends on the actions of management, specifically their consumption of “non-pecuniary benefits” (perks).   Researchers found not all agents adhere to making decisions in the best interest of principals--the principal-agent agency problem (Boshkoska, ;Hilt, ;Tseng et al., ). financial contracting literature.) 2. Established Views of Financial Structure The modern corporate finance litera- Incentive (Agency) Problems The most famous incentive paper in the corporate finance li'terature is Michael Jensen and William Meckling ().

  Agency cost is the sum of three types of costs, cost of designing the contract, cost of enforcing the contract (monitoring and bonding) and residual loss if contract is not optimal. Solutions of agency problems; Monitoring; Management compensation; Incentive compensation; There are two major principal agent model, adverse selection and moral. government contract you will have to be able to remain compliance with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). have any problems if and when you face an audit. In order to show your compliance, your company is awarded the contract that it has the financial means to complete all the tasks that. are required. Second, they want to check.   Agency problem is a conflict of interest inherent in any relationship where one party is expected to act in the best interest of another. Agency problem arises when incentives or motivations. HDMA14 V-l WORKINGPAPER CHOOLOFMANAGEMENT AgencyProblems,FinancialContracting, andPredation PatrickBolton DavidScharfstein WP# February MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTEOFTECHNOLOGY 50MEMORIALDRIVE CAMBRIDGE,MASSACHUSETTS

Agency Problems, Financial Contracting, and Predation的话题 (全部 条) 什么是话题 无论是一部作品、一个人,还是一件事,都往往可以衍生出许多不同的话题。. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 2 I. Introduction Contracting problems between suppliers and buyers motivate a vast literature on the boundaries of the firm (e.g. Coase (), Williamson (), Grossman and Hart ()).1 Buyers may enter into spot or relational contracts with suppliers or vertically. In general, an agency problem in finance usually happens when an agency (the management of a financial company) does not work in the best interests of the stockholders, (the investors).   The financial literature in the s and s described the agency problem in The history of the principal agency problem can be traced back to the time when civilisation and Contracting.